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Time in Archaeology:
An Introduction
SIMON HOLDAWAY AND LuANNWANDSNIDER

University of Auckland and University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Lifeway reconstruction is listed as one of the objectives of "World Prehistory," the ubiquitous course
taught in universities and colleges the world over
(e.g., Fagan 1995:8). It complements well the other
subdisciplines of anthropology, at least for beginning anthropology students, offering them a familiar approach to foreign material: if cultural
anthropologists study the behavior of present-day
(or at least near-to-present-day) peoples, then archaeologists may be expected to deal with peoples'
behavior from the past. Certainly, some archaeologists study the past aided by textual records, and
some cultural anthropologists are interested in
past historical experience. But this overlap only
enhances the perceived integration of approaches.
The clear message is that archaeology is about doing the ethnography of the past.
The problem is that our cultural anthropology
colleagues have changed the way they do ethnography. The postmodernist critique has laid bare
the fictive nature of the objective anthropological
experience. Ethnographies tell a story from a particular point of view that is only one of a range of
understandings of why things happen. What, then,
is the status of the archaeologists' lifeways reconstruction? To some, particularly the more radical
members of the postprocessual archaeology of the
1980s, all archaeological reconstruction was seen as
theory dependent and therefore subjective. Lifeway reconstruction, therefore, was held to reflect as
much about the society from whence the archaeologist originated as it reflected a reality experienced

by people in the past. And from the late twentieth
century, the indigenous voice can be added. No
longer do archaeologists have a monopoly on explaining what went on in the past. There are competing views and multiple lifeway reconstructions.
As archaeologists, we are being openly challenged
to defend the veracity of our reconstructions (e.g.,
Bender 2002).
The postprocessual critique has been well rehearsed in a variety of monographs and edited
essay collections, and we do not intend to add this
volume to the stack. Rather, the authors collected
herein wish to address the question of meaning in
the past from a different tack, one that we develop
by taking inspiration from articles written in the
early 1980s by Bailey, Binford, and others grouped
here under the term time perspectivism. As Bailey
defines the term in chapter 2, time perspectivism
treats all archaeological material records as palimpsests and asserts that there is a relationship between
the scale at which such records can be resolved and
the types of research questions they can be used to
answer.
That different explanations of the past are possible depending on the temporal scale at which
past human behavior is viewed is hardly a new
point or one that has been cast aside since Bailey
and Binford published their seminal papers (e.g.,
Rarnenofsky 1998). Other theoretical approaches
such as historical ecology (e.g., Balee 1998) and
Annaliste treatments (e.g., Bintliff. ed. 1991; Knapp
1992) have insisted on multiscalar views of the past.
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What sets time perspectivism apart from other approaches, however, is the insistence on readings
of the archaeological record as a unique historical
data set on which to base multiple scales of explanation. It is the rise of formation studies over the Jast
30 years that has provided the means to view the archaeological record in this way. The authors of this
volume seek explanations of the past that conform
to our understanding of how the archaeological
record was formed while at the same time dealing
with deposits as palimpsests and seeking explanations that are scale dependent.

To be sure, archaeologists have kept up with and
adopted many of the advances in social theory. But
in seeking to make archaeology relevant, they have
in many instances left the archaeological record behind. Archaeologieal explanation is often treated
as just another form of social explanation, the difficulty of which should immediately be obvious to
someone standing in front of a midden, eroding
house wall, or deflated hearth. The danger archaeologists face is that in failing to emphasize the archaeological nature of our perspective on the past
and our perspective on explanation, archaeology
will fast become an irrelevance (van der Leeuw and
Redman 2002). Why should indigenous people or
anyone else consider our explanations as valid in
their own terms, if we couch them in contemporary social theory while failing to convey that the
archaeological basis for explanation is quite different from that provided by contemporary "human
time" (Stein 1993) observation?
Of course there are exceptions to the blanket
criticisms made in the paragraphs above. Some archaeolOgists have considered the relationship between the formation of the archaeological record
and the nature of archaeological explanation. The
authors in this volume draw inspiration from a series of essays by Geoff Bailey (1981, 1983, 1987)
published in the early 1980s and a series of essays
published by Lewis Binford (1977a, 1978a, 1980,
1981a, 1981b, 1982, 1983a) during the same time period. Bailey (2007, this volume [ch. 2]) has provided his own introduction to the genesis of his
ideas. Similarly, Murray pur~ues the intellectual trajectories of time perspectivism in chapter II, using
the term introduced by Bailey. Murray (1999a) has
also recently written on Binford and time within
the context of the "Pompeii premise" debate with
Michael Schiffer.
Despite the lingering interest in time perspectivism by Murray and others, it must be said that
both Bailey and Binford ultimately failed to provide programmatic statements that inspired a' new
body of research, something that Bailey addresses
in this volume. What their work lacked was a clear
method for implementing the theoretical insights
they developed. There are therefore two objectives
for this book: to demonstrate that the problems

THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL RECORD

If archaeological explanations are to be taken seriously, on a par with, rather than replacing, other
kinds of explanations of the past, then we need to
be clear how our explanations are derived from the
archaeological record. Archaeologists have spent
a great deal of effort searching the theoretical literature to learn what drives humans to act the way
they do. Much of this searching has ranged across
the social sciences, often delving into studies conducted over the short term, using observational
scales rarely exceeding the lifetime. To what extent
do these studies actually engage the content of the
archaeological record?
The need to show that archaeology may be
used to study the same types of phenomena as
those studied by social scientists when dealing with
contemporary peoples seems to have largely overtaken the need to answer this question. As Yoffee
and Sherrat (1993) comment, archaeology alone
among the social sciences has failed to build its
own social theory. The contemporary social theory of other disciplines, first seen as a source for
explanatory inspiration, has in some cases become
a prescription for how archaeology should be undertaken. Shennan (1989 ), when retrospectively reviewing the impact of Binford and Binford's New
Perspectives in Archeology (1968) and Clarke's Analytical Archaeology (1968), makes it clear that this
charge is not unique to postprocessual archaeology. New Archaeology's initial interest in culture
process rapidly gave way to interests in social, ecological, economic, and ideological processes, isolating what to Clarke was unique about archaeology.
2
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identified in the early literature have not gone away
and to illustrate, through a series of case studies
presented in the chapters that follow, a set of methods that can be applied to overcome these problems
and thereby reinstate time perspectivism in the
agenda of archaeological theoretical discourse.
In this introduction, we review time perspectivism and provide a brief intellectual history of time
in archaeology, indicating why we have brought together a group of authors to talk about their ideas
for an archaeological concept of time derived from
formation studies of the archaeological record. In
so doing, we provide an introduction to the chapters that make up this volume, as well as illustrating
in a little more depth our reaction to the topic of
lifeways with which we ~pened.

resent individual items accumulated at the time of
manufacture, construction, and initial use, they are
also reflective of the reuse and redeposition of artifacts as well as the reoccupation of places by a variety of peoples for a variety of purposes. Features,
for example, show the accumulation of instances
of refurbishment, destruction, and reconstruction (M. E. Smith 1989), whereas artifacts may be
reduced through wear or resharpening, acquiring traces that reflect their use-life histories (sensu
Sullivan 1978). The studies that emphasize the significance of these processes for interpreting archaeological materials have largely developed since
Bailey's, Binford's, and Foley's seminal essays. These
studies have allowed a new generation of archaeologists to develop methods that allow the application of time perspectivist ideas.
Most archaeologists would accept the importance of site and artifact reuse, but although ethnoarchaeological studies are widely directed at
investigating the manufacture, use, and abandonment of artifacts and features, when such use-lives
are considered at all, they are, rather ironically, often synthesized to construct long-term conditions
that show little or no temporal change. The various
strategies-mobility, technological, settlement, organizational, behavioral-that archaeologists increasingly turn to as explanatory devices (Hegmon
2003; Holdaway and Wandsnider 2006) are typical examples. These strategies invariably take stability over some span of time as a given. The great
time depth offered by archaeology is often vaunted
(e.g., Hodder 2001, introducing Mithen 2001 and
Meskell20OI). Apart from an extension or refinement 'of the chronometry of human prehistory,
however, the outline of significant events in general archaeology has changed little over the decades
since the radiocarbon "revolution" (Dunnell 1982).
Much explanation continues to be, in Dunnell's
terms, proximate and functional and, therefore,
timeless. Despite a wider range of tools with which
to assess the palimpsest-like nature of the archaeological record that Bailey and Binford discussed,
little progress has been made in understanding
how the life histories of the artifacts and features
that form such a palimpsest might influence the nature of archaeological inference and therefore the

TIME PERSPECTIVISM

Time perspectivism was formulated around the
idea that observations made at different temporal
scales differentially make different processes apparent. Applied to the archaeological record, time perspectivism provides an alternative to the view that
the vagaries of preservation provide for only an incomplete account of past ("human time" [Stein
1993]) behavior (Bailey 2007, this volume). Bailey,
Binford, and Foley (198Ia, 1981b, 1981c) independently developed variations on this idea at much
the same time. It was clear to all three scholars that
archaeological deposits in the main represent the
remains of repeated events and therefore offer the
opportunity of studying processes operating at
temporal scales longer than an event (e.g., Bailey
1981; Binford 1981a; Foley 198Ia).
But what was less clear was how this observation
could be applied to archaeological remains. Both
Bailey (1983) and Binford (1977a) were interested
in what they termed methodological (or conceptual) uniformitarianism. If stone artifacts or animal carcasses are reduced in nonrandom ways and
can be shown to have clear material signatures identifiable over the short term, and if a methodological uniformitarianism based on the observations
can be sustained, then archaeological relationships can be interpreted (see also DeBoer and Lathrap 1979). This was clear enough in the late 1970S
and 1980s. But while archaeological deposits rep3
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ultimate goals of an archaeological interpretation
of historical processes.

erties of the archaeological record (the way various
time-dependent processes are responsible for artifact deposition) and ultimately a much greater understanding of the kinds of questions that may be
asked of this record and the kinds of explanations
of the human past it supports.
The temporality of deposits formed a key aspect in Clarke's (1973) well-known exposition
of the New Archaeology in Britain, a statement
picked up by Sullivan (1978, 1995a) in the United
States. Equally important was an early essay by Isaac
(1972) wherein he suggested that the long time
depth represented in the Paleolithic record might
require a different type of explanation than the culture histories being written for more recent periods. Binford (198Ia), Foley (198IC:8-9), and others
followed these leads, arguing that patterns in artifact densities are a product of repetitive behaviors
maintained over long time periods reflecting stable
configurations of humans, artifacts, and the land
surface and emphasizing the taphonomic nature of
archaeological deposits through studies of the various ways in which objects accumulate. For Foley
(198Ib:173), all archaeological deposits are palimpsests that vary only in the scale at which they may be
interpreted. His (1981C:180) off-site approach was
directed at providing spatial rather than chronological information relating to past behavior, with
the aim of understanding long-term land use in relation to resource distribution.
Binford's theoretical interests were directed
slightly differently. In the now famous article introducing foragers and collectors, he (1980) related the development of palimpsest deposits with
different histories to different types of mobility
among hunter-gatherers. Specialized versus generalized palimpsests were discussed with reference to
the Mask site (Binford 1978a) as well as Nunamiut
seasonal camps (Binford 1978b). In addition, Binford's understanding of the archaeological record
is clear from two further concepts. First, he (1978a,
1978b, 1980) discussed the temporal significance
of geomorphological processes of archaeological
site formation by using the concept of the temporal grain ofdeposits, the degree to which behavioral
events might be resolved within a deposit. Second,
he (198Ib) introduced the concept of historical

THE TAPHONOMIC
METAPHYSIC

Paynter (2002), correctly in our view, argues that,
whatever the original goals of the New Archaeology, its application quickly descended into a
synchronic, functionalist interpretation of the archaeological record. Nevertheless, there remain
several developments in the archaeological literature beginning in the early 1970S that either directly
or indirectly addressed the status of the archaeological record as a medium through which to develop
historical explanations. We believe that, viewed
with the hindsight of history, these studies, though
never forming a recognizable alternative to the processual and postprocessual bodies of literature, are
sufficiently coherent to be labeled the taphonomic
or formational metaphysic and provide a methodological door through which time perspectivism
can be approached.
This metaphysic began to cohere, we suggest,
with publication of Michael Schiffer's (1972) seminal article on archaeological and systemic context.
Here, Schiffer effectively promoted the study of
the archaeological record and, with his colleagues,
subsequently went on to develop behavioral archaeology (Reid et al. 1975). The behavioral archaeologists extended archaeological research to
explain the full breadth of relationships between
human behavior and material culture in all times
and places (Schiffer 1995:ix). Although Schiffer
was criticized for attempting lifeway reconstruction (Binford 198Ia), albeit from a perspective that
offered a detailed consideration of nonfunctional
sources of variation (Murray 1999a), behavioral archaeology emphasized Cartesian time in a way that
had few precedents. Cartesian views of time assume that objects have both a position in space and
a trajectory through time independent of other objects. Behavioral archaeologists reflected this view
by studying artifact life histories and describing the
complex ways artifacts moved back and forth from
Schiffer's systematic and archaeological contexts
through time (e.g., DeBoer 1974). From this came a
much better understanding of the temporal prop4
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integrity to describe the similarities and differences
in the conditions that led to the formation of an archaeological deposit. These studies culminated in
what might be described as a landscape perspective using the "rocks with eyes" analogy (Binford
1983a). For Binford (1982, 1983a), archaeological
deposits result from the actions of many generations of individuals, all of whom abandoned artifacts and features as epiphenomena of a collective
long-term behavioral system in which they were involved, the definition of which forms the goal of
archaeology.
Extensions of this landscape perspective by
other authors quickly followed, with the introduction of the term place use histories to describe
the differing sequences of deposition and different geographic locations (Camilli 1983, 1988; Camilli et al. 1988; Sullivan 1992a; Wandsnider 1998).
Dewar and McBride (1992) discussed remnant settlement patterns and introduced the concepts of
spatial contiguity and temporal continuity to discuss place occupation through time. Kelly (1988),
in following these ideas, uniquely included geological criteria such as surface deflation and stability in
his attempts to describe depositional history.
It was Stern (1993, 1994a), however, who most
clearly articulated the relationship among depositional history, time averaging as described in the
geological (paleontological) literature, and observations on time perspectivism offered by Bailey
(1981,1983,1987; see also Bailey 2007; Murray 1997,
1999a, 2002). For Stern, the archaeological record
is to be seen as a time-averaged material sample of
the remains ofpast human activity. Like many paleontological deposits, time-averaged archaeological
deposits are formed over prolonged periods of time
such that items (artifacts or fossil organisms) found
within a single deposit may originate from a variety
of different cultural systems (or habitats ).In applying these concepts, Stern elaborated on Binford's
notion of historical integrity, noting the timeaveraged nature of fluvial deposits from Koobi Fora
that incorporated materials derived from a variety
of landscape features with different temporalities.
Because of the temporal complexity of the deposits, Stern argued that many of the high-resolution
behavioral, that is, "lifeways," interpretations of ar-

chaeological deposits with hominid remains and
artifacts are inappropriate.
Not only must the temporality of the interpretation be matched to the temporality of the deposit,
but time-averaged deposits do not represent an average in time (see de Lange, this volume; Stern, this
volume). It is not a question of trying to match a
single behavioral scenario to explain the formation
of an archaeological deposit. Rather, time-averaged
deposits are better thought of as the summation of
materials derived from a variety of behaviors and
contexts. Thus, lifeway reconstructions cannot be
made as though materials derive from an "average"
of behavior.
In treating the archaeological record as a timeaveraged sample composed of items that do not necessarily share a common depositional history, Stern
espoused a view of the archaeological record close
to that advocated by geoarchaeologists (as well as
some others). DeBoer (1983), for instance, drew a
parallel between archaeology and paleontological
taphonomic studies, arguing that the complexity
of formation processes would disallow an isomorphism between the archaeological and systemic
contexts. Stein (1987) proposed that archaeological
deposits should be seen as an aggregate of sedimentary particles, each particle having its own particular history. According to this view, the record is
an accumulation of separate particle histories, only
some of which are the result of a single process.
Dunnell (1992) commented favorably on this approach while promoting his evolutionary view of
archaeology and drawing a contrast between functional ecological explanations and historical explanations of how things come to be (Dunnell 1980).
For Dunnell (1982), materialist approaches to historical causation offer the only hope for a truly
evolutionary archaeology. In what he described
as a time-like reality, things are always in the process of becoming, and relations between observations are dependent on both time and place. Thus,
the goal of evolutionary archaeology continues to
be not an understanding of the archaeological record as a series of essentially timeless behavioral
scenarios but, rather, to seek cause in the selection
of attributes from a pool of continuous variation.
For many, whereas the explanatory framework of
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evolutionary archaeology seems overly restrictive
(but see Shennan 2002), a materialist rather than
essentialist metaphysic has much appeal. Ramenofsky (1998), for instance, has discussed the need to
match the temporal scale at which a research question is pitched with the data observed at an appropriate scale. She argues that a materialist view is
most consistent with such a multiscale approach.
As referenced above, those who follow the
Braudelian Annales scheme see virtue in searching
for conjunctures, the interaction of processes that
occur over the short term (involving individuals
and events), the medium term (periods spanning
socioeconomic and demographic cycles), and the
long term (environmental changes [Bintliff 2004D.
Smith (1992), in discussing the Annales approach,
links the Braudelian scheme to Butzer's (1982) configuration of ecology and systems theory, thereby
overcoming Braudel's static view of the environment. Like Braudel, Smith sees the interaction of
processes operating at these different scales as critical for interpreting the past. For Smith, however,
the distinction between the essentialist and materialist metaphysic discussed above is something of a
red herring. Smith argues that periodization is unavoidable because it is not possible to study continuous change. Therefore Smith feels that chronology
poses methodological rather than theoretical problems and is best addressed by refining chronology
into as small a set of units as possible, the equivalent
of Braudel's short-term events.
On its own the identification of short-scale
events in the archaeological record is not problematic. Lucas (2005:48), for instance, argues persuasively that these are manifest in the deposition of
single artifacts and burials. But where both Lucas
and Smith fail is in their inability to demonstrate
how the time-averaged nature of the archaeological
record is to be addressed when these events are combined into assemblages. Whereas short-term events
may be easily defined, the medium- and long-term
patterns are only manifest at the assemblage level,
defined according to Stern (1994a, this volume) by
the minimum chronological resolution of the deposit as a whole. It is not at all clear how these patterns are formed from the individual events that
accumulate to form the assemblage and therefore

how they may be interpreted using conventional
social theory. The problem that both Smith and
Lucas face is made clear by Blake's (2003) analysis
of Byzantine-era reuse of Sicily's prehistoric rockcut tombs. Rather than giving an explanation for
the reuse of these sites based on an attempt by the
Byzantine-era people to identify with a prehistoric
past (and hence the medium to long term), Blake argues that "this phenomenon of reuse resulted from
a fortuitous convergence of the older site's familiar presence and new pan-Mediterranean cultural
currents" (2003:218). In this case, documentary evidence is sufficient to demonstrate the absence of a
link between the short and medium to long term;
however, the situation is not always this clear. The
temptation is always to stretch the linkages and
construct a narrative account that forges links between temporal scales without sufficiently demonstrating their presence or, indeed, as Blake was able
to do, their absence.
ANTHROPOLOGY,
ARCHAEOLOGY, AND TIME

Anthropologists are interested in the temporality
implied in telling time. "Going slow" does not just
mean working less quickly but has a definite social
implication as well (Munn 1992). The classic time
questions in anthropology refer to the social conceptualization of time (GellI992). Recent essays
edited by Karlsson (2001) and by Gingrich and colleagues (2002), for instance, discuss a variety of approaches to time. Artelius (2001) considers Viking
conceptualizations of time, relating these to Viking
resistance to Christianity and its foreign temporal
concepts. Damm (2001) comments on the disjuncture between the timeless traditional stories of the
Bugakhwe of Botswana and the new, historical stories they now recognize as being necessary to argue
claims to land. Schieffielin (2002) provides examples on linguistic usages that deliver temporal signals, and Paynter (2002) investigates time in terms
of the various narratives told about a particular
place. Bender (2002) discusses landscapes as a multivocal entity associated with different views of the
historical past.
A few archaeologists have taken their lead from
studies like these and investigated aspects of time
6
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that are specific to certain cultures and worldviews
(e.g., chapters in Murray, ed. 1999; see also Lucas
2.005 and van Dyke and Alcock 2.003 on the archaeology of memory). Bradley (1998, 2.005) has developed the archaeology of time in a slightly different
direction focusing on monuments. Using a distinction made by Rowlands (1993) between memories
in the form of monuments as inscriptions versus
memories that are incorporated through the use of
monuments (i.e., through practice), he (1998:90)
argues that despite the acknowledged imprecision
of archaeological chronologies, regularities exist in
the archaeological record because societies maintained rituals over long periods of time. More recently Bradley (2.0os:chapter 7) has developed this
idea using Renfrew's (2.001) claim that the major
change in human society occurred not with the advent of modern humans but with the beginnings of
sedentary life. For Bradley, the shift from huntinggathering to the sedentary exploitation ofdomestic
plants and animals marked a fundamental change
in the nature of the archaeological record, one that
is manifest both in the nature of ritual practice and
in the creation of more temporally stable patterns
in the archaeological record compared with the record created by hunter-gatherers.
Whether or not the record of hunter-gatherers
is truly different from that of those with a domesticated economy is of course open to debate, but
from a time perspectivist position the worry is that
the apparent stability and relative ease of interpretation of the record of sedentary peoples are an artifact of the presence of long-lived structures and the
temptation to interpret activity in relation to these
structures in synchronic terms. In much the same
way that the hunt for disjuncture in the Annales approach promotes seamless transtemporal narrative
(e.g., Bintliff 2.004) rather than interrogation of
such (ida Blake 2.003), it is very tempting to look, for
instance, for activity zones within a house structure
that has a longevity measured in decades or more.
Patterns that appear are, of course, the outcome of
palimpsest deposits and therefore little different
from the medium-term accumulation of artifacts
deposited by hunter-gatherers on a surface. Thus,
easily apparent pattern may be as much the result of
the presence of interpretable structures as an out-

growth of a change in the nature of ritual behavior.
Nevertheless, Bradley's observations help explain
why the examples discussed in the chapters here are
largely those of hunter-gatherers rather than more
sedentary peoples. Because hunter-gatherer groups
by and large lack permanent structures, the palimpsest nature of the archaeological record they create
is much more apparent and much harder to gloss
using synchronic narrative. Therefore, archaeologists, including a number of authors in this volume,
have to some degree been forced to look for alternative types of explanation, particularly forms that
are less reliant on contemporary social theory.
In a now classic article, Ingold (1993) discussed
the relationship between what he termed the "taskscape" and the landscape. The taskscape consists of
an interconnected set of tasks, and the landscape
is an array of related features. But rather than keep
these as separate entities, Ingold argued that with
the understanding of the landscape as fundamentally temporal comes the notion that human activities must be seen as nested within "the wider
pattern of activity for all animal life, which in turn
nests within the pattern of activity for all so-called
living things, which nests within the life-process of
the world" (1993:164). This is clearly a call for the
type of multiscalar explanation advocated by Ramenofsky (1998) and Smith (1992.), among others.
Such explanation, however, has not so far been informed by the "formational metaphysic" discussed
above. Multiscalar, materialist explanation provides a unique archaeological view on human history that is most effective when combined with a
sophisticated understanding of the time-averaged
nature of the archaeological record and interpretations derived from the last 30 years of formational
studies. As Murray (2.004) indicates, too often archaeologists have taken the easy "out" and, in the
face of a palimpsest record, effectively ignored time
and sought a synchronic, functional explanation
that denies a historical past.
The problem is not the lack of formation studies; although there are no doubt more such studies that need to be undertaken, the message is clear
enough that there exist no simple relationships between the archaeological record and the nature
of behavior that created this record. Rather, the
7

SIMON HOLDAWAY AND LuANN WANDSNIDER

problem lies in the ease with which the message
can be dismissed in the search for "higher" social
explanation (read "lifeway reconstruction," even
if couched in the guise of, for example, an evolutionary behavioral strategy or the manipulation of
agents). Formation studies are often acknowledged
as important, but they are used as a way of removing the "noise" from patterns that can then be directly assessed with behavioral or social theory.
Why are archaeologists so disinterested in time,
and why have they resisted the implications of the
formational metaphysic? Paynter (2002) sources
the problem to a processual archaeology that was
not concerned with chronology but only with
documenting change from one steady state to the
next. Dunnell (1980) makes much the same criticism, noting that the historical explanation favored
by Binford (1962) at the dawn of the New Archaeology quickly came to be replaced by a synchronic
functionalism. Murray (1987, 1993, 1997), however, places the problem much earlier, shortly after the foundation of archaeology as a discipline in
the mid-nineteenth century. Here, he argues, the
founding fathers of archaeology were faced with
the need to develop an explanation for humanity's
past, greatly extended in time. They chose contemporary ethnographic analogy and, with it, essentially timeless synchronic explanation, a temporal
scale of interpretation that modern archaeology
has been unable to shed. He argues that rather than
accept a consensus position on archaeological theory, it is time th~t archaeologists acknowledge the
antiquity of their own explanatory framework and
consider a range of alternatives.
Most archaeologists consider studies of the archaeological record to be important but tend to
separate these studies into a methodological category, separate from theoretical concerns (e.g.,
Hegmon 2003). From the earliest days of the New
Archaeology, it was not the archaeological record
that was thought to limit the types ofquestions that
could be addressed but, rather, the ingenuity of the
archaeologist in deriving ways to interpret this record. Thus, though the New Archaeology, and particularly behavioral archaeology, led to a concern
with how the record formed, with rare exceptions
(e.g., Plog 1973,1974), the nature of the record was

seen as a methodological rather than a theoretical
challenge.
Not everyone views the record in this way. Some
archaeologists, particularly geoarchaeologists, like
their colleagues in geomorphology, paleontology,
and ecology, accept that the nature of deposits, archaeological or otherwise, influences the analytical and therefore interpretative scales at which the
past is viewed. The case is most clearly stated among
paleontologists, where the long time spans and
range of taphonomic processes combine to limit
the degree to which fossil deposits may be interpreted as the ancient remnants of biological communities (see de Lange, this volume). Paleontological deposits are time averaged; they combine within
a single unit materials that derive from a number of
potentially unrelated events. The minimum chronological unit used to interpret these events does not
represent the time span of the events themselves
but, rather, that of the unit in which they are deposited. In many cases this time span will extend
well beyond that typically associated with observations of organisms existing together within an ecosystem. In the same way that paleontologists have
questioned the relationship between fossil populations and ecological communities, archaeologists
need to ask whether behavioral observations derived from short-term ethnographic observations
relate to the long-term and palimpsest nature of
most archaeological records.
Numerous authors in this volume deal with deflated records where the question of time averaging is made much more obvious through the lack of
stratigraphy in the conventional sense. With buried deposits, it may be easier to maintain the fiction
that material from the same layer was deposited at
the same time or at least as a result of the same occupation. That this is only very rarely so is increasingly
apparent as a result of geoarchaeological studies
that critique not only the simple equation of stratigraphic changes with changes in occupation type
but even the cultural association of stratigraphy at
all (e.g., Stein 2000).
Palimpsests, rather than living floors, characterize the archaeological record of all times and places.
If an archaeological deposit results from the activities of many different peoples who undertook
,
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different types of actions that produced artifacts
through time. and moreover occupied a location
for variable amounts of time. sometimes leaving
the place completely. what then do the patterns apparent in the material culture left by these peoples
mean in a behavioral sense? As Michael Schiffer
(1972.) noted so long ago. items found associated
were not necessarily used together. This must introduce an element ofdifficulty into functional assessments. yet this problem has received relatively little
discussion (but see Wandsnider 1996).
Some archaeologists undertake a search for living floors. sites where the conditions of burial mean
that artifacts were deposited within a relatively
short span of time. in the hope of discovering a record where Time's Arrow can be effectively ignored
(surely the ultimate irony for an archaeologist).
Taken to an extreme. one might imagine a living
floor representing such a short span of time that no
artifacts were deposited and no structures formed
at all, although even such a site. in effect unrecognizable archaeologically. would still not be immune
from the influence of Time's Arrow (Bailey 2.007).
For patterns to appear in the archaeological record
artifacts need to accumulate. Therefore the passage
oftime and the formation ofpalimpsests as a consequence are the very processes that make the record
interpretable. Without the accumulation of palimpsest deposits. too few events will have occurred
to form an,archaeological record.
Living floors and functionally associated tool
kits presuppose artifacts manufactured. used. and
discarded as the result of a Single event. The artifacts in such scenarios are manufactured to fulfill
a single need. Yet such a synchronic view underplays the results of research that indicates that all
artifacts are to some degree the products of complex use-life histories (DeBoer 1974; DeBoer and
Lathrap 1979). This is most ~learly seen when the
form ofartifacts changes as a result ofuse. The wellknown tool resharpening studies of Middle Paleolithic scrapers. for instance. indicate that certain
tool forms. classified on their morphological differences into distinct types. were in fact the result of
repeated reworking of the tool edge (Dibble 1984.
1987). Thus. assemblage composition. measured as
the proportion of different tool forms. each with

a different life history. reflects not the functional
utility of a group of tools used at one particular
instant but the outcome of combining many such
scenarios through time. The pattern resides in the
palimpsest. not in the functional instant.
TIME PERSPECTIVISM
AND THIS VOLUME

The chapters in this volume provide a variety ofapproaches that seek to exploit the palimpsest nature
of the archaeological record in its various forms.
Bailey's chapter sets the scene by discussing the
history of the development of time perspectivism
and the nature ofpalimpsests. Subsequent chapters
deal first with palimpsests of artifacts and features
found within sites and then with the temporal significance of artifact use-life histories. A series of
chapters relates use-life histories to their geoarchaeological situations within a landscape context. and
a further series uses the same concepts to consider
assemblage formation. Two final chapters deal first
with the relationship between ethnoarchaeology
and time and. second. provide an overview of time
perspectivism in relation to the present volume.
Sullivan. in chapter 3. discusses the.types of behavioral information that may be inferred as a result of feature abandonment. but rather than seek
an interpretation based on a simple dichotomy between planned and unplanned abandonment. diachronic and synchronic (the equivalent of a living
floor) assemblage formation. he accepts that all assemblages take time to form. What may appear to
be the simple consequence of different modes of
abandonment in his house assemblages becomes.
when the assemblages are viewed as accumulations
with temporal depth. the result of distinctly different seasonal poses practiced by the people who deposited these assemblages. His investigation'relies
on the elaboration of the "trace" concept first introduced by Sullivan in 1978.
Shott (ch. 4) picks up on the notion of artifact use-life histories to investigate the temporality of the earliest East African sites. His goal is to
resolve a debate that pits a time perspectivist view
of assemblage composition against one based on
synchronic function. Like Olivier (1999). he is
able to resolve the impasse by viewing artifacts and
9
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logical approaches to the time periods over which
deposits were formed to assess the temporality of
occupation across the Wyoming Basin of intermontane North America. Not all sites represent the
same temporality; some are the product of quite
short occupation duration and limited reuse offeatures, whereas other locations saw more intense
reuse over longer periods. If the impact of the period over which surfaces were available to accumulate material is brought into the mix, it is possible
to assess the span of time during which occupation
occurred and the degree to which features were reutilized. Developing instruments that permit analysis of the formational complexity of palimpsests
offers a landscape archaeology that is not based on
analogies drawn from a synchronic settlement pattern and not based solely in timeless system time
(departing from Ebert 1992).
Relying on geographic information system manipulations, Dooley (ch. 6) proposes a battery of
such instruments to help assess the temporality of
medium- and long-term occupation in the northern North American Great Plains. He is well aware
that the chronological resolution of his surface assemblage is not fine enough to put forward conventional synchronic behavioral interpretations, so he
has modified his goal to document instead longterm landscape evolution as a way of addreSSing
how the humanly created environment attracted or
deflected past occupation.
Holdaway, Fanning, and Rhodes (ch. 7) first
discuss the temporality of the landscape, noting
that in western New South Wales, Australia, land
surfaces, and therefore the archaeological record
they preserve, may differ considerably in age. A
"dots on maps" approach to the identification of
settlement patterns, wherein all sites and assemblages are treated as part of a coherent whole, is not
applicable. Rather, like Wandsnider (ch. s), they
suggest that assemblage formation must be assessed
in relation to the geomorphological history of the
surfaces on which the deposits are found. Artifact
assemblages in turn are not the functional remains
of moments in time but reflect time accumulations
over the time periods during which sedimentary
deposits formed. Assemblage comparison shows
patterns produced by varying temporal histories of

assemblages not as the static outcome from manufacturing events but, rather, as the accumulation
of a series of activities that continuously form and
reform the archaeological record. As in Sullivan's
piece, significantly different inferences are possible
if it is accepted that the archaeological record represents an accumulation of material through time,
and explanations are sought that are compatible
with this accumulative nature.
Although use-life history may be most apparent in portable artifacts, particularly those manufactured in materials like stone where the reductive
nature of the technology means that much ofthe sequence of reuse episodes is retained on the artifact,
it is no less important in the morphology of other
artifact forms and materials. Thus, Olivier (1999) is
able to show how use-life histories of a variety of artifact forms found as grave goods in Hallstatt burials inform on the complex temporality ofa site type
once identified as a "closed find," the structural
equivalent of a living floor. Despite the burials superficially appearing to be the outcome of a burial
event, Olivier is able to show that the temporality
of the site is reflected in the different histories of
grave goods, some from distant sources, some from
much more restricted geographic locations. Even
the structure itself shows a history of use beyond
manufacture for a single event. Evidently, the burial
chamber was opened at a later time, with material
added and perhaps some removed. The elegance of
Olivier's analysis comes from interpreting the sites
not as the result of temporally discrete events but,
rather, as the outcome of a series of actions undertaken through time.
This alternative reading of the temporality of
material things forms the basis for three of the chapters in this volume that turn the problem posed by
surface archaeological sites on its head. The living
floor ideal is rejected, and the "problem" posed by
the conflation of artifacts from multiple events is
turned into an advantage. All three chapters exploit the life histories of artifact types as a way of
drawing inferences about the temporality of the record, albeit from widely differing geographic locations and therefore different technologies.
Wandsnider (ch. s) uses a variety of portable
artifact types as well as structures and geoarchaeo10
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deposition that are not interpretable using conventional functional sets of inferences.
Three further chapters use geoarchaeological
concepts combined with considerations of time averaging to look at various aspects of assemblage formation. Stern in chapter 8 makes a detailed case for
an alternative form of analysis to one based on the
definition of a set of sequential, stratigraphically
defined assemblages at different sites. Based on a
careful geoarchaeological analysis of the formation
of sedime'rlts in Pleistocene caves from Tasmania,
she argues for the definition of the equivalent of the
minimum archaeological stratigraphic unit used in
the analysis of a paleolandscape (Stern 1993). The
crucial question for arialysis then becomes the differences in assemblage composition that accrue as a
result of different rates and durations of accumulation, rather than interpretations based on assumptions about the functional equivalence of activities
conducted at different sites.
De Lange (ch. 9) reviews the results of Bailey's
Klithi research considering the nature of inferences
that are drawn from lithic and faunal materials. Her
critique centers on the relationship between the
temporality of deposits containing artifact and faunal assemblages and the temporality implied by the
types of analyses performed. At Klithi, a mismatch
is apparent in the time-averaged nature of the deposits versus short-term explanations framed in
terms oflithic reduction sequences and prey selection options. De Lange's solution is to suggest that
archaeologists follow more closely the approach adopted by paleobiologists, where the time-averaged
nature of the record is used as the basis for picking
which analytical techniques are selected and therefore what forms of inference can be made.
One of the outcomes of an essentially synchronic view of the archaeological record is that we
also tend to look for causation in synchronic terms,
yet at any moment, action is a product of processes
beginning in the past and continuing into the future (Bailey 2007). This is as true for ethnography as it is for archaeology, a point emphasized
by Arnold in chapter ro. Ethnoarchaeological descriptions should not be seen as timeless vignettes
but, rather, as having as much relevance to the
study of change as archaeological data. As Arnold

states, both ethnographers and archaeologists effectively view their data at one particular time, the
intersection of the observer and the observed, and
processes that affect these data have operated, and
will continue to operate, both before and after this
point in time. Ethnoarchaeologists are particularly
well suited to study some types of change-Arnold
discusses supplanting/supplementing and intensification/ extensification-when the temporality of
the observations can be matched to the temporality of the explanation.
A final chapter in the volume, by Tim Murray,
provides an epilogue extending the background
to the previous essays by identifying some of the
questions that remain to be answered as well as the
themes that are central to all of the chapters. Murray is interested in the relationships among time,
the empirical, and the theoretical in archaeology.
He argues that despite the range of what at face
value appear to be fundamentally different theoretical approaches to contemporary archaeology,
nearly all maintain the archaeology as anthropology metaphysic. Time perspectivism emanating
from Bailey's 1980s essays has clearly failed to spark
the archaeological imagination and promulgate an
alternative to mainstream archaeological theory.
Murray searches for reasons why time perspectivism should hold such a peripheral status in relation
to the, disciplinary cultural norms.
CONCLUSION

Perhaps it is not so surprising that archaeology,
the discipline that above all others should be concerned with time, is in effect so unconcerned with
anything to do with time except chronometry.
Despite much discussion about the need to consider long-scale temporal processes, as the chapters in this volume illustrate, taking time seriously
and thinking about the archaeological record are
not straightforward issues. Interpreting what happened in the past as a reflection of familiar scales of
behavior is the easy out. Such explanations seem so
much clearer because they are easy to comprehend,
but in many cases, probably the majority, these explanations fail because they lack a connection between the temporal scale at which the record can
be analyzed and the temporal scale implicit in the
II
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explanation. That this is no trivial failure is underlined by the virtual ubiquity of palimpsests, in all
their various forms, in the archaeological record.
Archaeologists may be able to address a wide range
of research questions, but not all these questions
will be applicable to the entire archaeological record. In addition, the types of explanations gener-

ated will in many cases depart from those familiar
examples based on short-term lifeways. There are
two ways to react to this situation: a retreat into
conventional archaeological explanation or, as authors attempt here, the development of alternate
ways to describe an archaeologically based past.

